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1 • Truncated codifferentlal method for nonsmooth 
convex optimization 
Adil Bagirov, School of Information Technology & 
Mathematical Sciences, Univers ity of Ballarat, 
University Drive, Mount Helen, P.O. Box 663, 3353, 
Ballarat, Victoria, Australia, 
a.bagi rov@hallarat.edu.au, Ali H:tkan Tor 
In this paper a new algorilhm lU minimize convex functions is de-
veloped. This algorithm is based on the concept of codiffcrential. 
Since the computation of whole codiffcrcntial is not always possi-
ble we propose an algorithm for computation of desce nt directions 
us ing only a few elements from the codifferential. The convergence 
of the proposed minimization algorithm is studied and rcsulL~ of 
numerical cxpcrimcnL~ using a set of test problems with convex ob-
jective function arc presented . We also compare the new algorithm 
with the bundle method using the results o f numerical experiments. 
2 • Recente results on graphs with convex quadratic 
stability number 
1\tfaria F Pacheco, lnstitu to Poli tecnico de Bragan<ra -
ESTiG, Quinta de Santa Apol6nia, Gab. 112, 
530 1-857, Bragan<ra. Po rtugal, pacheco@ ipb.pt, 
Domingos Cardoso 
The main results about graphs with convex quadratic s tability num-
ber (that is, graphs for which the stability number can be determined 
by convex quadratic programming) are surveyed including the most 
recently obtained. Furthermore, a few algori thmic techniques for 
the recognition of this type of graphs in particular families are pre-
sented. 
3 • An upper bound on the 2-club number of a graph 
Car/os J. Luz, Math, Escola Sup. Tecnologia Sett.lbal/ 
Instituto Po litecnico de Sett.lbal, Campus do IPS, 
Es tefanilha, 2910-76 1, Sett.lbal, P ortugal, 
cluz@est. ips.pt 
A 2-club of a graph is a subset of nodes that induces a subgraph of 
diameter 2. This communication deals with the maximum 2-club 
problem which consists on find ing a maximum 2-club in an undi-
rected given graph. The cardinality of a maximum 2-club of a graph 
is usually called the 2-club number of that graph. We fi rs t present a 
convex quadratic programm ing upper bound fo r the 2-club number 
of a graph. Then, we state a suffic ient condition for a graph to attain 
the proposed upper bound. Finally, we improve the offered upper 
bound and report on its application to several graphs. 
• WD-25 
Wednesday 12:55-14:15 
GST- S 25 
Cooperation in assignment and inventory 
situations 
Stream: Cooperative Game Theory 
Invited session 
C hair: Judirh Timmer, Dept. of Applied tvlathematics, 
University of Twcnte, P.O. Box 2 17, 7500 AE, Enschede, 
Nether lands, j .h.timmer@utwcnte. nl 
1 - The maximum and the addition of assignment 
games 
Si/via Miqud. C/.Jaume 11 73. 2500 I, Llt: ida, 
-;miqucl@matcmatica.ud l.cal, i\l;Jrina Nuncz 
Shaplcy and Shubik (1972 ) define assignment games as coopem-
tivc TU games for two-sided markets. Here, we consider a fin ite 
set of assignment games and each set of players can choose to play 
in one of those games. This is rcpn.:sentctl hy the maximum of as-
signment games and a balancedncss condition is obtained. We also 
consider that each set of players can play simultaneously more than 
one assignment game and then add the profits. T his is represented 
by the sum of assignment games which is balanced. Under some 
conditions, the core of the sum game coincides with the sum of the 
cores . 
2 • Cooperation in stochastlc inventory models with 
continuous review 
Judith Timmer, Dept. of Applied Mathematics, 
University of Twente, P.O. Box 2 17, 7500 AE, 
Enschede, Netherlands, j .b.timmer@utwente.nl 
We study the inventory manag~ment of multiple fi rms facing 
stochastic demand. All inventories are monitored continuously. 
Firms may form a coali tion and place joint orders for replenishment 
of their inventories. In particular, as snon as one firm reaches its 
reorder point all other fi rms in the coalition join this firm and order 
up to their desired inventory levels. The corresponding cost game 
is studied for properties and nice solutions. Analytical studies show 
that the game is concave and balanced . Hence, the Shaplcy value is 
a natural candidate fo r cost allocation among the firms. 
3 - Inventory transportation networks: benefits by col-
laboration 
Ana Meca, O perations Research Center, Universidad 
M iguel Hernandez, Avda. Universidad s/n, Edificio 
Torretamarit, 0320 2, Elchc, Alicante, Spain, 
ana.meca@umh.es , Jl.fl Gloria Fiesrras-Janeiro, 
fg nacio Garcia-Jurado, tvfanue/ A lfredo Mosquera 
Rodriguez 
The aim of this talk is to study inventory situations where trans-
portation costs arc different for each agent. The underlying alloca-
tion cost problem is analyzcd by defining a class of cooperative T U 
cost games. We characterize the s ituations for whic h cooperation 
is profitable and propose some allocations of the total cost. One or 
these allocation is obtained "it la Shupley' by computing the aver-
age of some marginal costs which belong to the core. We provide 
a characterization of this rule us ing properties as E-Balanced Con-
tribution (EBC), Extreme agent solidarity (EAS), and E-Transfcr 
(ETR). 
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1 - Lot sizing by considering purchase discount in mrp 
system 
Fa/Jimeh S hamsaei, De Lismortel 340, 56 12 AK. 
Eindhoven, Eindhoven, Netherlands . 
f_shamsaei @ i nd.iu~t.ac . i r, Mehdi Hcyduri 
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